All-Podcast-Secrets

To Be Or Not To Be [Podcast or Netcasting] Ipod September 23, 2006 11:43 AM
I read with great interest in Micro Persuasion by Steve Rubel,efforts
by Apple Computer to protect their Branding Position Of , “Ipod!”. Apple
has spent Millions on developing Brand Identity ! The Ipod may be as identifiable
as Coca Cola ! I personally feel any one has the right to protect their products
in the Market ! I have read a few posts on the net, that are against Apples
efforts ! Will there be a payoff in their efforts I don’t have an answer the real
problem will be the use of “POD!”

Does Apple own the pod? Could podcasting, podcasts, and anything with the word “Pod” in the name become the property of Apple computers? Current legal actions taken by Apple include applying to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to register the word “pod” as a trademark [2] and filing cease and desist orders with any company using the word “pod” in their title. [3] [4]
In response, technology expert Leo Laporte has suggested changing the name to Netcast. [5]
Will this be an example Of Gamer Theory ? [ Ask the Folks At Google]
Investopedia Says: Game theory attempts to look at the relationships between participants in a particular model and predict their optimal decisions. One frequently cited example of game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma.

game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a type of non-zero-sum game in which two players can “cooperate” with or “defect” (i.e. betray) the other player. In this game, as in all game theory, the only concern of each individual player (”prisoner”) is maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player’s payoff per se. In the classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. In simpler terms, no matter what the other player does, one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play defect.
The unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution—that is, rational choice leads the two players to both play defect even though each player’s individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperate. In equilibrium, each prisoner chooses to defect even though both would be better off by cooperating, hence the dilemma.
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma the game is played repeatedly. Thus each player has an opportunity to “punish” the other player for previous non-cooperative play. Cooperation may then arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive to defect is overcome by the threat of punishment, leading to the possibility of a cooperative outcome. If the game is infinitely repeated cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium.
In game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a type of non-zero-sum game in which two players can “cooperate” with or “defect” (i.e. betray) the other player. In this game, as in all game theory, the only concern of each individual player (”prisoner”) is maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player’s payoff per se. In the classic form of this game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that the only possible equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. In simpler terms, no matter what the other player does, one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play defect.
The unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution—that is, rational choice leads the two players to both play defect even though each player’s individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperate. In equilibrium, each prisoner chooses to defect even though both would be better off by cooperating, hence the dilemma.
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma the game is played repeatedly. Thus each player has an opportunity to “punish” the other player for previous non-cooperative play. Cooperation may then arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive to defect is overcome by the threat of punishment, leading to the possibility of a cooperative outcome. If the game is infinitely repeated cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium.
more freedom less crap